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Abstract 
 
 
This paper not only considers the regulatory challenges faced by regulators, but also the potential of 
responsive regulation and particularly meta regulation to address these challenges. It explores 
developments which have necessitated a change from the traditional form of regulation, that is, 
command and control regulation to more responsive hybrids of regulation. Even though traditional 
regulation has its advantages, its inability to address the demands of changing business environments 
has resulted in the adoption of more flexible forms of regulation such as risk based regulation and 
responsive regulation. Whilst the potential of responsive regulation is considered, the complexities 
and challenges faced by the regulator in identifying and assessing risk, solutions aimed at countering 
problems of risk regulation, along with the problems arising from different perceptions of risk will be 
addressed only briefly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Responsive Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance Between 
Persuasion and Penalisation 
 
 
 
The challenges faced by regulators inter alia include the difficulties in addressing the problem 
of uncertainty generated by non prescriptive rules. Such uncertainty regarding the required 
level of minimum compliance could result in some companies going beyond what is actually 
required in complying with such  rules.1A consequence of the uncertainties regarding what is 
required by the law and the strong incentive to ensure compliance, which includes increased 
penalties, is evidenced by the difficulty in distinguishing between “beyond compliance” and 
“over compliance”.2 According to Gunningham and Johnstone, the encouragement given to 
organizations to go beyond strict legal requirements, constitutes an important benefit of more 
flexible and less prescriptive models of regulation.3 Gunningham also asserts that the 
unsatisfactory performance of both direct government regulation and market deregulation has 
compelled a review of present regulatory strategies, hence resulting in an experimentation 
with alternative mechanisms such as economic instruments, self-regulation, co regulation and 
a range of information based strategies.4 In his opinion, the design of a “third phase” of 
regulation, one which still involves government intervention, but selectively and in addition to 
a range of market and non market solutions, will be required in order to address the 
inefficiencies of traditional regulation, on hand, and the flaws inherent in deregulation on the 
other hand.5  
 
 
4.1 Interactions between states and markets 
Legal regulation 
 
The occurrence of interactions between states and markets does not take place in a vacuum.6 
Such interactions determine the position assumed by legal regulation.7 The characterisation of 
different types of law has occurred on the basis of reference to the their "location in space".8 
Legal pluralism, which is generally perceived to be a prominent form in globalisation, refers 
to “geographical or metaphorical notions of space in its conception of law.”9 
 
A consideration of legal regulation as state-market interactions simply does not generate 
analytical questions which relate to the nature of these interactions, but also prescriptive 
questions, namely, the degree of state intervention and market ordering required for the 
facilitation of effective regulation.10 
                                                 
1  See F Haines and D Gurney ‘ Regulatory Compliance: The Problems and Possibilities in Generic Models of 
Regulation’ in ’Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance’ R Johnstone and R Sarre (eds) (2004) Research 
and Public Policy Series No 57 at page 24 
2  ibid at page 24; also see BH Kobayashi ‘Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the 
Antitrust Laws Against Corporations’ (2001) George Washington Law Review 69 (6) 715-744 
3  N Gunningham and R Johnstone Regulating Workplace Safety: Systems and Sanctions 1999 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press at page 35 
4  N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 35 
5  ibid at page 10 
6  B Lange ‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ Sage Publications (2003)12 (4) 413 
7  ibid  
8 ibid at page 414 
9 ibid 
10 ibid at 416 
 
Changes in state-market relationships are reflected through: Gradually blurred lines between 
states and markets, which is attributed to the privatization of states and the dominance of 
markets by powerful corporate actors.11 Further, in response to changing state-market 
relationships, modern forms of legal regulation have developed.12 
The privilege of the inclusion of state-economy interactions in considering legal regulation 
derives from the definition of legal regulation, which can be defined as the regulation of 
economic activities.13 
 
 
“Decentring regulation” is used to express the notion that governments should not and do not 
have a monopoly on regulation and that regulation is now being carried out by other actors 
namely: large organisations, collective associations, professions, technical committees etc 
without government's involvement or even formal approval.14 Decentring also refers to 
changes occurring within government and administration : the internal fragmentation of the 
tasks of policy formation and implementation.15 Self-regulation fits into this analysis because 
it is a form of 'decentred' regulation as it is not state regulation.16 
 
Enforced Self Regulation 
 
The responsive approach (to regulation) proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite involves a 
process whereby regulators proceed with compliance based strategies and then resort to more 
punitive “deterrents” where the desired level of compliance is not achieved.17 In their opinion, 
this is a more preferable option to the positions supported either by those who believe that 
“gentle persuasion works in securing business compliance with the law”18 and those who only 
consider that corporations would only comply with the law where tough sanctions were 
applied. Greater regulatory challenges, in their view, were to be found, not at the apex of the 
pyramid of regulatory strategies, nor at the base of the pyramid, but at the intermediate levels 
of the pyramid of regulatory strategies.19 Such intermediate sections, thus, were in greatest 
need of regulatory innovation.  
With the responsive approach, it is assumed that regulation would always commence at the 
base of the pyramid. The Enforced Self-Regulation Model is a form of responsive regulation 
whereby negotiation occurs between the state and the individual firms to establish regulations 
that are particularized to each firm.20 In the Enforced Self-regulation Model, each firm is 
required to propose its own regulatory standards in order to  avoid harder (and  less  tailored) 
standards imposed by the state.21 This individual firm is “enforced” in two senses :22 
                                                 
11  See B Lange ‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ Sage Publications (2003) 12 (4) 413 
12  ibid 
13  See S Picciotto ‘Introduction: Reconceptualizing Regulation in the Era of Globalization’ in D Campbell and 
S Picciotto (eds) ‘New Directions in Regulatory Theory’, special issue of the Journal of Law and Society 
29(1) 1-11 
14 J Black,  'Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post – 
Regulatory' World (2001) in M. Freeman (ed.) 103 
15 Ibid  p 104 
16 Ibid  p 113 
17  I Ayres  and  J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) Oxford: 
Social Legal Studies at page page 101 
18  ibid at page 20 
19  ibid at page 101. A range of certified punitive strategies exist at the apex of the pyramid whilst experience of 
the successes and failures of the free market and  of self regulation (aimed at protecting consumers) can be 
found at the base of the pyramid, ibid 
20 ibid p 101 
21 ibid 
 
First the firm is required by the State to do the self-regulation. Second, the privately written 
rules can be publicly enforced. Governments are advised to resort to “command regulation 
with non-discretionary punishment” only after having considered, firstly, the provision of 
solutions which are self regulatory to industries, and where the relevant goals were not 
achieved under this option, the subsequent adoption of a more rigorous approach of 
“command regulation with discretionary punishment” through enforced self regulation.23 As a 
result of the susceptibility of states to capture and corrupt related activities in business, it is of 
immense importance for third parties, non government organisations particularly, to be 
directly involved in the oversight of regulatory enforcement.24 As well as this function of 
acting as a safeguard against the capture of state regulators, non government organisations can 
also directly regulate businesses themselves through schemes which they oversee.25 
Responsive regulation considers the role of non government organisations as regulators to be 
so fundamentally important, in the same way that businesses play a vital role as regulators – 
as well as regulatees.26 
 
Although the ‘pyramid of regulatory strategies’ is directed at individual regulated firms, a 
parallel approach is applied by Ayres and Braithwaite to entire industries.27 
 
Enforced self regulation was not only proposed as a means of striking a balance between the 
advocates of “gentle persuasion” works best and those who favour tougher measures, but also 
considered to be of greatest need at the intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory 
strategies28. In striking this balance between compliance and enforcement measures, Ayres 
and Braithwaite contribute to resolving regulatory difficulties faced by regulators, of when 
best to apply either compliance or punitive measures, and in situations where the use of  
excessive punitive deterrent measures could conceal harsh treatment of less significant 
regulatees. According to Baldwin and Black, Ayres and Braithwaite acknowledge the possible 
difficulties of moving down the regulatory pyramid since relationships between regulators and 
regulatees, which are foundations for less punitive strategies, could be influenced through the 
application of overly punitive sanctions.29 Furthermore, ‘voluntary’ compliance at the base of 
the pyramid could be rendered extremely difficult as a result of constant threat of punitive 
measures at the top.30  
 
Further criticisms directed at the pyramid approach, in addition to the above mentioned 
criticism, can be classified into three groups, namely, “the policy” or “conceptual”, “the 
practical” and “the constitutional”.31 Legal problems which exist in applying a responsive 
approach may arise from the fact some legislatures may have stipulated deterrence procedures 
                                                                                                                                                        
22I Ayres  and  J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) Oxford: 
Social Legal Studies at page 101 
23 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 5 
24  See J Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’ (2006) World Development Volume 
34 No 5 at page 888 
25  ibid; also see Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation, chapter 3. 
26 ibid 
27 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 5 
28  Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation at page 101 
29 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 
30  ibid  
31  R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 and for further criticisms, see ibid. 
which may leave little scope for the enforcement agency in adopting such an approach.32 
Furthermore, responsive regulation would be difficult to implement in corrupt societies since 
it encourages situations whereby discretion is given to bureaucrats who may exploit such 
discretion for purposes aimed at promoting their own interests.33 
 
The incentive structures which exist within a firm become very crucial in issues involving 
voluntary or involuntary compliance. Whilst it has been observed by some34 that good 
regulatory practice should focus on outcomes of regulatory objectives, rather than compliance 
with prescriptive rules, the concern relating to whether compliance is ‘voluntary’ or 
‘involuntary appears to be of irrelevance as long as compliance is ultimately achieved. 
Nevertheless, compliance is vital , hence the need for direct monitoring by the State or 
government. 
Three fundamental elements exist in implementing responsive regulation.35 The first of these 
consists of disapproval which is systematic, fairly directed and explained in its entirety. The 
second element combines such disapproval with a respect for regulatees , whilst the third 
consists of increased intensification of regulatory response in situations where the regulator 
has tried considerably, but without success, to meet those standards which are required. 
 
4.2 Traditional Regulation 
 
Advantages of Traditional Regulation 
 
Although command and control regulation has been criticized for its rigidity, such rigidity 
having contributed to economic inefficiency, Latin suggests that this approach has 
advantages.36 Furthermore, these advantages extend beyond those advantages identified with 
more tailored and flexible instruments.37 
- ……”decreased information collection and evaluation costs, greater consistency and 
predictability of results, greater accessibility of decisions to public scrutiny and participation, 
increased likelihood that regulations will withstand judicial review, reduced opportunities for 
manipulative behavior by agencies in response to political or bureaucratic pressures, reduced 
opportunities for obstructive behavior by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood of social 
dislocation and “forum shopping” resulting from competitive disadvantages between 
geographical regions or between firms in regulated industries”.-38 
The ability to define the expected behavior of regulatees with immense clarity, constitutes the 
major strength of command and control regulation.39 Not only does this enable breaches of the 
                                                 
32  ibid at page 9 
33  See J Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’ (2006) World Development Volume 
34 No 5 at page 896 
34  See F Haines and D Gurney ‘ Regulatory Compliance: The Problems and Possibilities in Generic Models of 
Regulation’ in ’Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance’ R Johnstone and R Sarre (eds) (2004) Research 
and Public Policy Series No 57 at page 19; P May and R Burby ‘Making Sense Out of Regulatory 
Enforcement’ Law and Policy 20 (2) 157-182, J Black ‘Rules and Regulators’ Journal of Law and Society 26 
(2) 215-239 (1997) Oxford: Clarendon Press  
35 See R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 , and also J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Restorative Justice  (2002) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
36  N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 42 
37 ibid; also see H Latin ‘Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
“Fine Tuning” Reforms’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review at page 1271 
38  ibid 
39 N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 42 
legal standard and legal enforcement to be identified in a relatively straight forward manner, it 
defines limits of regulators’ operations which enables the firms to have a clearer 
understanding of their regulatory obligations.40 
 
Addressing the Deficiencies of Traditional Regulation 
 
“Responsive regulation is distinguished (from other strategies of market governance) both in 
what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be”.41 Ayres and 
Braithwaite also propose that regulation be responsive to industry structure – since different 
structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation.42 According to 
Baldwin and Black43, in order to be “really responsive”, regulators are required to be 
responsive - not only to the level of compliance of the regulatee, but also to the frameworks 
within the firms – both operating and cognitive, to the environment which encompasses the 
regulatory regime, which is broader and institutional, to the different ways whereby 
regulatory tools and strategies operate, to the performance of the regime and ultimately, to 
changes which exist within each of the mentioned elements. Regulation, it is argued, is 
responsive when it knows its regulatees and its environments, when it is capable of coherently 
organizing different and new regulatory modes of reasoning, when it is sensitive to 
performance and when it recognizes what its changing challenges are.44 Baldwin and Black’s 
opinion of what is really responsive would have to take into consideration the growing impact 
of risk.45 
 
Gunningham advances the argument that the deployment of a range of regulatory actors to 
implement combinations of “policy instruments”, which are tailored to individual goals and 
circumstances, will generate more effective and efficient policy outcomes and that this 
approach should reduce the regulatory burden on government, thereby liberating scarce 
resources for apportionment to those areas which are in greatest need of government 
intervention.46 Greater focus is also placed on the ability of second and third parties - be it 
business, commercial or non commercial third parties- to act as quasi regulators who would 
complement or act as substitutes for government regulation in particular situations.47 
Proposals are advanced whereby a set of principles and policy prescriptions can be designed 
to achieve a “regulatory mix”.48 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Self regulation, co regulation and meta regulation 
 
Self regulation and Co regulation 
                                                 
40  ibid at page 41 
41  Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation   p  4 
 
 
42   ibid 
43  R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at pages 3 and 4 
44  ibid 
45 See M Ojo ‘The Growing Importance of Risk in Regulation’ Munich Personal Archive (2009) < 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13723/> 
46  N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 15 
47 ibid 
48 See ibid at page 19 
 
The exercise of control, by a group of firms or individuals, over its membership and their 
behaviour can be considered as self-regulation.49 Variables of self regulation consist of the 
governmental nature of self-regulation, the level of involvement of self regulators and the 
extent of the binding legal force which is connected to self-regulatory rules.50 Claims in 
favour of self regulation or the incorporation of components of self regulation into 
governmental regulation are based on arguments related to expertise and efficiency.51 
“Coregulation, as distinct from enforced self-regulation, is usually taken to mean industry-
association self-regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by government.”52 It is 
distinguished from enforced self regulation in that with enforced self regulation, negotiations 
which are aimed at establishing regulations that are tailor made to each firm, take place 
between the state and individual firms.53 
 
 
Meta Regulation 
Why Meta Regulation Could Be the Most Responsive Form of Regulation  
 
Regulation may be regarded as a response to risk54 and the control of risks can be considered 
to be the main concern of regulation.55 “The regulatory state is becoming a risk management 
state”56. Ulrich Beck argues that whilst the standard way of risk regulation in modern societies 
was well suited for such societies, it is not responsive enough to our “post modern” 
societies.57 Risk is, as a result, inefficiently controlled at too high a cost.58 Recent years have 
                                                 
49  See R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 125 
50  ibid at pages 125 and 126 
51  ibid at page 126; In relation to expertise, it is usually advanced that self-regulatory bodies possess greater 
expertise than is the case with independent regulation. Efficiency is also a ground put forward by proponents 
of self regulation in that self regulation emphasizes the ability of self regulation to generate controls in an 
efficient manner – since there is greater accessibility to those being controlled. Furthermore, self regulators 
are able to acquire information at lower costs, incur low monitoring and enforcement costs and can easily 
adapt their regimes to changing industrial conditions; ibid at page 127. 
52  P Grabosky and J Braithwaite,. Of Manners Gentle; Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business 
Regulatory Agencies, (1986) Oxford University Press, Melbourne at page 83 
53  See also I Ayres  and  J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) 
Oxford: Social Legal Studies at page 101 and R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at pages 125-127 
54  U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications ; also see C Hood, H 
Rothstein and R Baldwin The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk (2001) Oxford University Press  
55  R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University 
Press at page 138 
56  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
23 and also see B Fischoff, SR Watson and C Hope ‘ Defining Risk’ Policy Sciences 17 (1984) 
57 See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications and also M Lassagne 
and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic 
Management’ see< http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf> (last visited 17th 
March 2009) According to Ulrich Beck and other sociologists’ considerations of the “risk society”, nature 
does not play a role in generating risks in the sense that risks are no longer the consequence of external or 
uncontrollable factors such as “force majeure” but are generated through man made decisions. Cultural 
theorists however, argue that attitudes to risk differ according to cultural preferences. See R Baldwin and M 
Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at page 141. 
Also see M Douglas Risk and Blame (1992) London 
58  It can be observed from daily occurrence that more attention should be devoted to recent evolution toward 
risk based regulation, examples of which can be found in recent European and partly Western-rule setting as 
illustrated by the Basel II agreement on the regulation of risks in banking and the European Commission 
White Paper on how to regulate risk in the chemical industry. For more information on this, see M Lassagne 
and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic 
witnessed growing acceptance of the fact that the efficiency of regulation will be enhanced 
where a collaboration with private control systems exists.59 By utilising activities which relate 
to private internal control systems for purposes which are of public regulatory nature, 
regulators are not only able to relieve themselves of the cumbersome work which derives 
from rule making, but are also able to concentrate on the oversight of the functioning and 
design of local systems.60 ‘Enforced self regulation’, ‘regulated self-regulation’ and ‘meta 
regulation’ are various forms which a responsive model may assume and  such a model 
assigns a central role to internal control systems.61 Basel II bank regulation reforms constitute 
an example of meta regulation. 
 
Meta regulation is referred to as the regulation of self regulation62 whilst meta risk 
management implies the risk management of risk management. Traditionally risk 
management, to a large extent, has focused on complying with current rules.63 It has great 
potential especially in situations where risks are volatile and where the regulator is not in a 
position to comprehend such risks.64 However maximum realisation of such potential can only 
occur only where such risks are within the control of an enterprise where the regulator holds 
an influential position.65 
 
As was mentioned in the above paragraph, over the years, there has been a trend towards 
greater regulation of business management processes and strategies of regulated firms through 
regulatory tools which address the role of senior managements of firms and directly regulate 
individuals within firms.66 According to Fiona Haynes67, meta regulation “with its 
collaborative approach to rule generation”, could controversially be considered to be the 
approach with greatest evolvement when considered in relation to other approaches such as 
co-regulation, enforced self regulation and process or management-based regulation. Meta 
regulation is a method which is capable of managing “self regulatory capacity” within those 
sites being regulated whilst exercising governmental discretion in stipulating the goals and 
levels of risk reduction to be achieved in regulation.68 Processes and procedures for risk 
management are developed, not only by key stake holders, but also by personnel within these 
organisations.69 This takes place whilst ensuring that “pro-compliance motivational postures” 
are generated within the site being regulated such that the goal of the regulator, that is, risk 
reduction, is achieved.70 The success of the implementation of meta regulation is based on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Management’ <http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf >(last visited 17th March 
2009) 
59  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
21. 
60  ibid 
61  ibid; Also see E Rosa, ‘Meta Theoretical Foundations For Post Normal Risk’ Journal of Risk Research 1 
(1998) 
62  See the penultimate chapter of Christine Parker’s book, C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- 
Regulation and Democracy. 2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
63  M Lassagne and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and 
Strategic Management’ see http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf (last visited 
17th March 2009) 
64  J Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Governance Paper to Risk Regulation, Accountability 
and Development Conference, University of Manchester, 26-27 June 2003 at page 1 
65 ibid 
66 J Gray and  J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation  (John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2006 at page 2 
67  F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 (forthcoming) at page 3 
68  ibid at page 1 
69  ibid at page 3; Also see C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- Regulation and Democracy. 2002 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
70  ibid 
regulator and regulated organisation’s understanding of risk priorities in the same manner.71 
Meta regulation is advantageous particularly where there are complex causes of harm, which 
also require constant monitoring.72 
 
However, problems related to enforcement exist. Legal and General Assurance Society v FSA 
highlighted how the more holistic focus which meta regulation has on systemic failures on the 
part of firms, rather than their specific acts or omissions, is starting to influence the ways of 
approaching issues of causation in the framework of regulatory responsibility. 
 
The increasing popularity of internal control systems has been an express feature of risk 
management.73 Primary or real risks74 are translated by internal control systems into systems 
risks such as early warning mechanisms and compliance violation alerts.75 As a result, many 
risks are capable of being and are being “operationalised” as organisational processes of 
control.76 Such transformation is a pre requisite for the feasibility of risk based regulation – 
which will be discussed in the final section of this article.77 
 
 
Enforced Self Regulation envisions that in particular situations, it will be more efficacious for 
the regulated firms to take on some or all of the legislative, executive and judicial regulatory 
functions.78 Ayres and Braithwaite however stress that whatever particular regulatory 
functions should be “sub contracted” to the regulated firms would be dependent on the 
industry’s structure and historical performance and that delegation of legislative functions 
need not imply delegation of executive functions. 
The issue of monitoring is crucial in the model of Enforced Self-Regulation. In  achieving the 
right mix of regulatory strategies, the right reallocation of regulatory resources would be 
important.79 Direct government monitoring would still be necessary for firms too small too 
afford their own compliance groups.80 State involvement would not stop at monitoring as 
violations of the privately written and publicly ratified rules would be punishable by law .81 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite demonstrate that Enforced Self-Regulation might produce simple 
specific rules that would make possible both more efficient, comparable accounting and easier 
conviction of violators.82 
 
Good regulatory policy could therefore be said  to constitute  an acceptance  of  the 
inevitability of some  sort  of symbiosis between  state regulation and self  regulation.83  
                                                 
71 F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 (forthcoming) at page 17 
72  ibid at page 1 
73  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
24 
74  Primary risks, for example financial loss are distinguished from secondary risk (reputational  risk) see ibid at 
page 32 
75 ibid at page 24 
76  ibid 
77  ibid 
78  Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation   p 103 
79I Ayres and  J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate  ( New York: 
Oxford Union Press 1992) 129 
80 Ibid  p 106 
81 ibid 
82C Hadjiemmanuil, 'Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: A Trend Towards Megaregulators, United 
Kingdom: Full Consolidation as a Response to the Inefficiencies of Fragmentation'   p  109 
According to Rose – Ackerman (1988)84, good regulatory policy should be a combination of  
self – regulation and  state regulation. Issue relates to what  proportion of  self-regulation or 
state regulation should make up a good regulatory policy. This is of vital importance as proper 
delegation of a certain percentage of responsibilities to the state and individual institutions 
would reduce many of the disadvantages of the Enforced Self Regulation Model. 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite also argue85 that good policy analysis is not about choosing between 
the free market and government regulation nor deciding what the law should prescribe. They 
suggest that an understanding of private regulation, its interdependence with state regulation 
is required to achieve the mix of private and public regulation. 
 
Achieving the right mix of private and public regulation is one of the greatest challenges in 
designing a good regulatory policy. Ayres and Braithwaite86 contend that there is no such 
thing as an optimal regulatory strategy and that there are just different strategies that have a 
mix of strengths and weaknesses. They go on to say that the appropriateness of a particular 
strategy depends on the legal, constitutional and cultural context and history of its invocation. 
 
Gunningham and Sinclair87 propose two vital components of a successful regulatory design 
namely, regulatory design principles88 and instrument mixes.89 Regulatory processes are 
classified into four namely:90 Identification of the desired policy goal(s) and tradeoffs 
necessary to achieve it, identification of the unique characteristics of problem being 
addressed, identification of the range of potential regulatory participants and policy 
instruments and identification of opportunities for consultation and public participation. 
 
Regulatory principles are classified into five namely:91Prefer policy mixes incorporating a 
broader range of instruments and institutions, prefer less interventionist measures which 
include the principle of low interventionism, ascending a dynamic instrument pyramid to the 
level required to achieve policy goals – including building in regulatory responsiveness, 
empowering participants which are best placed to act as quasi regulators – including the 
application of the principle of empowerment and maximizing opportunities for win-win 
outcomes – including the consideration of whether firms will voluntarily go beyond 
compliance. Instrument mixes92 are broadly classified into those which involve inherently 
complementary activities93, inherently counter productive instrument combinations, 
sequencing instrument combinations94, combinations where outcome will be context specific 
and multi instrument mixes. 
                                                                                                                                                        
83 I Ayres and  J Braithwaite,  Responsive  Regulation :  Transcending  the  Deregulation  Debate   (Oxford 
Union Press 1992)  3 
84 Ibid  at  p 3 
85 Ibid at  p 3 
86 Ibid at  p 101 
87See concluding chapter ‘Designing Environmental Policy’ by N Cunningham and D Sinclair in N Gunningham 
and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : Clarendon Press 
88 ibid at pages 387-419 
89 ibid at pages 422- 448 
90 see ibid at pages 378-385 
91 supra note 88 
92 supra note 89 
93 These include voluntarism and command and control regulation, self-regulation and command and control, 
command and control regulation (or self regulation) and supply side incentives, command and control (or self 
regulation) and broad based economic instruments (which target different aspects of a common problem), 
liability rules and command and control (or self regulation) 
94 These include self regulation and sequential command and control, self regulation and sequential broad based 
economic instruments 
 
4.4 Responsive regulation v risk based regulation 
 
Theoretically, regulatory regimes can become more responsive to the self-organisation of 
regulatees regardless of whether such regulates are banks or local government service 
providers.95 Risk based regulation, in Power’s view, is considered to be a blue print for the 
“risk management state”.96 
 
In comparison to responsive regulation, risk based regulation is relatively new.97 A risk based 
approach to regulation, particularly enforcement, was recommended by the Hampton Review 
in March 2005.98  In the aftermath of the Hampton Review, ‘risk based’ regulation has been 
implemented primarily through inspection and enforcement procedures which are derived 
through an examination of risks posed by a regulated person or firm to a regulatory agency’s 
objectives.99 
. 
 
Risk based regulation has been adopted by several regulatory agencies as a means of 
organising resource allocation, managing limited resources and concentrating those resources 
where are they are needed most - for example, in cases involving banks with weak internal 
controls.100 Such an approach is strategic and goal oriented at the same time.101 The link 
between risk and strategy is vital in advertising new regulatory approaches and risk 
management and would also improve communication between the regulator and the 
regulated.102 
 
Responsive regulation is distinguished from risk based regulation since the latter focuses on 
analysis and targeting rather than a “process of responsive escalation”103. Whilst the 
framework of risk based approaches not only enables regulators to relate enforcement-related 
activities to the achievement of objectives, but also allows for the targeting of resources  in 
such a way which prioritises the highest risks, the main controversial issue surrounding risk 
based regulation relates to inspection. 
 
Furthermore, risk based regulation is an embodiment of the idea that regulatory failures are 
possible – in contrast with the concept of zero tolerance.104 Whilst some events can be 
classified as being of “zero-tolerance” nature, such an event as that of the fall of Equitable 
Life, which could be considered as ‘tolerable’ from the perspective of a systemic financial 
risk, in fact, generated life changing catastrophic consequences for many.105 
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Other problems which relate to risk based regulation derive from the fact that “drivers of 
action” are short term random and irrational considerations, focus is not necessarily given to 
the most important risks, there is likelihood that risk based systems will tend to neglect lower 
levels of risk, which may aggregate to risks of immense and dangerous proportions.106  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The transformation of internal control into risk management can be attributed to an 
increasingly volatile financial environment and the emergence of complex financial products 
(for example, derivatives). Whilst such factors necessitate the need for risk management, 
several consequences emanate from an excessive operation of risk management, namely107: 
Reliance on internal controls may increase risk if it leads to an undermining of the knowledge 
of risk in other areas; despite the benefits of risk management, concerns are generated due to 
the fact that secondary risk management has become an accepted “organisational common 
sense”108- reflecting the society’s loss in faith in its professions and public organisations.109 
According to Baldwin and Cave, the first regulatory challenge faced by regulators consists in 
the identification of risks that need to be reduced – not only on the basis of priority, but also 
in a way which would be approved by the public.110 Secondly, regulators are confronted with 
the challenge of managing and regulating risks in a way which is both effective and 
acceptable.111 Furthermore, the design of institutions and techniques for managing risk, the 
choice of the appropriate regulatory technique, issues relating to whether risk management or 
regulation should be “blame oriented” and the contentious topic of reliance by risk managers 
on qualitative risk evaluations in contrast to more quantitative methods of assessments 
constitutes additional challenges.112 
 
In spite of the above mentioned consequences and challenges, the ability of responsive 
regulation to address such a complex113 factor as risk, its flexibility and responsiveness to 
regulatees and its environment among other advantages, make it a more desirable regulatory 
tool than traditional regulation or risk based regulation. Whilst direct monitoring by the State 
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would be required, the involvement of third parties such as non government organisations 
would also be crucial to ensuring that a situation, whereby the State could be captured, is 
avoided. Furthermore the possibilities available in achieving the right “regulatory mix” make 
it a promising regulatory tool. Even though the contested nature of risk contributes to the 
difficulty of relying on risk as a regulatory tool, its presence and ever growing significance 
cannot be ignored – hence the need for a form of regulation which is able to manage risk more 
effectively  and which would best suit an evolving regulatory environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
